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Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. S78-2a-3 (2) (j) .

The

Defendants appeal two summary judgments rendered bv the Third
District Courtf in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, the Honorable Timothy Hanson and the Honorable John
Rokich each presiding.

Both cases on appeal were subsequently

consolidated by the Utah Supreme Court prior to their transfer
to the Court of Appeals.

-2ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the granting of summary judgment was

appropriate in each of these cases.
2.

Whether the Defendants admissions on file and

opposing affidavit presented a genuine issue of material fact
precluding summary judgment.
3. Whether the representations of Plaintiff's agent
in regards to the personal liability of Appellants is an issue
that must be heard by the trial court prior to the Court entering judgment against the Appellants personally.
4.

Whether Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law against Appellants personally.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellee (Interlake), initiated three (3) foreclosure actions against John Swank and the Appellants (Allyns)
relating to real property situated at 315 East 300 South and
1092 Gambel Place in Salt Lake County, State of tjtah.

Two of

these actions were brought against the property located at
1092 Gambel Place.

These actions were later consolidated

before Judge Hansen.

The third action was brought against the

property located at 315 East 300 South.

This action came

before Judge Rokich.
Attached to each Complaint were copies of the various documents that ultimately were relied upon by Interlake
in its Motion for Summary Judgment.

It is interesting to note

-3that upon close review of these documents, the signatures as
they relate to the Allyns are often inconsistent with the
named parties.

In addition, the Allyns usually sign in a

representative capacity.

It is also interesting to note that

the documentation was prepared by Interlake and was witnessed
by Interlake's agent, Jeffrey Perkins.
Interlake propounded
for Admissions to the Allyns.

Interrogatories

and Requests

In answer, the Allyns acknow-

ledged signing the documents referred to in the Complaints,
acknowledged there being a default and set forth an affirmative defense

that the Allyns were assured

by

Interlake1s

agent, Jeffrey Perkins, that Interlake would look only to the
property and not the Allyns personally for repayment of the
debt in the event of default.
Admissions par. 3.

Amended Response to Request for

A copy of Allyns Amended Response to

Request for Admissions is attached as an addendum to this
Brief.
On or about June 22, 1989, the Allyns counsel withdrew from the case.

Interlake, after serving its Notice to

Appoint New Counsel, subsequently

brought

Summary Judgment on November 6, 1989.

its Motions for

The Allyns response to

the requested admissions were used as the basis for Interlake's
Motion and were attached as Exhibits.

Interlake arqued that

there was no dispute of fact as to the signatures on the
documents and that as a matter of law it was entitled to

-4summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
On or about November 16, 1989, the Allyns1 counsel
entered an Appearance and moved ex parte for an extension of
time to respond to Interlake1s Motions.

Interlake then filed

its Requests for Ruling and Objections to Allyns1 Motion. Interlake^ objections were mainly based on allegations that the
Allyns had no meritorious defense to any Motions for Summary
Judgment.

Specifically, Interlake argued that none of the

transaction documents evidenced Allyns1 claims that they would
have no personal liability for the transactions.
Judge Hanson declined to rule on Allyns1 ex parte
Motion until Interlake submitted its response in accordance
with Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration.

Judge

Rokich, however, granted the Allyns additional time to file a
response in the matter before him.

On or about December 18,

1989, Allyns submitted their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment, together with an opposing Affidavit of
Douglas Allyn.

The opposing Affidavit stated upon personal

knowledge that Jeffrey Perkins, an officer of Interlake Thrift,
assured the affiant at the time the loan transaction was entered
into, that Interlake would only look to the property and not
to the Allyns personally for recovery of the debt in the event
of default.

A similar opposing affidavit was filed in the

case before Judge Hanson at about the same time.

Copies of

the Affidavits are attached as an Addendum to this Brief.

-5On January 5, 1990, Judge Hanson ruled that for the
reasons stated in Interlake's Objection, Allyns' Motion for
Additional Time should be denied.

In addition, Judge Hanson

granted Interlake's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the
pleadings and supporting documentation.

Judcre Hanson signed

his Order and Decree of Forclosure on February 6f 1990.
On

January

11, 1990, Interlake

filed

Memorandum in the case before Judge Rokich.

its Reply

In its Reply,

Interlake argued that the Parole Evidence Rule made the opposing Affidavit of Douglas K. Allyn inadmissible as evidence and
therefore Interlake was entitled to Judgment as a matter of
law. In addition to its Reply Memorandum, Interlake's counsel
addressed a letter to Judge Rokich and argued that the result
in that case must follow the result of its companion case before Judge Hanson.

Attached to the letter was a copy of Judcre

Hanson's ruling dated January 5, 1990 grantina summary iudqment
to Interlake.
Judge Rokich subsequently granted Interlake's Motion
"for the reasons set forth in Plaintiff's Memorandum.11

Judae

Rokich signed his Order and Decree of Foreclosure on Februarv 1,
1990. The Allyns appealed from each judgment by filing separate
Notices of Appeal on March 1, 1990.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The granting

of

Interlake's

Motions

for

Summary

Judgment were inappropriate under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Interlake's Motions were based on the

-6Defendants admissions on file, which when viewed in their entirety, raise the issue of the Defendants personal liability
in this matter.

In addition, the opposing Affidavit of Douglas

Allyn raises genuine issues of material fact which both trial
courts should have determined by the evidence orior to entering
judgment in Plaintiff's favor.
ARGUMENT
I
THE ADMISSIONS ON PILE AND THE OPPOSING AFFIDAVITS
RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
THAT PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Interlake moved for summary judgment based on the
documents attached as exhibits to the Complaints and upon the
Allyns1 Amended Response to Requests for Admissions.

In their

response, the Allyns admitted to their signature being on the
documentation and admitted to the notes being in default.

The

Response to Admissions in the case before Judge Hanson clearly
set forth the issue of the assurances made to the Allyns bv
Interlake that the Allyns would not be looked to personally in
the event of default, thereby inducing the Allyns1 signatures.
The same issue is raised by the opposing Affidavits of Douglas
Allyn filed with each Court.

In addition, this issue was

argued in Allyns1 Opposing Memorandum filed in the case before
Judge Rokich, where reference was made to the opposing Affidavit of Douglas Allyn and to the Answers to Interrogatories

-7propounded by Interlake.

Summary Judgment in both cases could

only have been rendered if a genuine issue was not raised by
the Admissions on file or the opposing Affidavits of Douglas
Allyn.

Otherwise, summary judgment is precluded.
a.

The Allyns1

reliance on their admissions in

opposing Interlake1s Motion for Summary Judgment was proper.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
sets forth the proceedings for obtaining a summary judgment.
If the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavitsf if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,
the judgment shall be rendered in favor of the moving party.
The admissions on file can be in any form, including
those requested pursuant to Rule 36.

Not only may a moving

party use the admissions of the adverse party to support a
motion for summary judgment, the adverse party may also use
his own admissions in opposing a motion or in bringing a
similar

motion

of

his

own.

f56.11(6) 2nd ed. (1988).

6 Moore's

Federal

Practice

Compare Pace v. Southern Express

Company, 409 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1969) cited therein.

(The

Court granted summary judgment to a party based on that parties1 admissions and depositions.)
In the present case, Interlake moved for summarv
judgment based on the Allyns1 admissions.

The admissions

-8filed

in the case before Judge Hanson clearly raised

the

issues of whether there was fraudulent inducement and whether
Interlake agreed to not hold the Allyns personally liable upon
default.

As a result, there was a genuine issue raised by the

admissions on file that precluded summary judgment.

Interlake

should not be allowed to pick and chose through the record
those portions it wants considered to achieve its desired
result.

Rule 56 clearly states that the admissions on file

must be considered.
b.

The opposing Affidavits of Douglas Allyn were

timely filed in both cases.
Rule 56(c) allows the adverse party to serve ooposing affidavits prior to the day of the hearing.

The procedure

follows that found in Rule 6(d) for other types of motions.
Rule 6(d) requires

that opposing affidavits be served not

later than one day before the hearing unless the Court permits
them to be served at some other time.
Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration
further define the proceeding in a motion for summary judgment.
This rule sets forth briefing requirements of the parties.
The responding party has ten days within which to file a
memorandum in opposition to the motion and supporting documentation.

If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in

opposition within ten days, the moving party may notify the
clerk to submit the matter to the Court for decision.

Upon

-9receiving the memorandum in opposition to motion, the moving
party is then able to file a reply memorandum within five days
after service.

After the five day period has expired, either

party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the Court
for decision.
Rule 4-501 is intended to establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on despositive
motions.

See 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration.

Although Rule 4-501 has been elevated from being a Rule of
Practice in the District Courts, it is intended to build upon
the Rules of Civil Procedure and is not meant to change or to
be inconsistent with those rules.

Specifically, it does not

redefine the time for filing opposing affidavits orior to the
day of the hearing.

It does allow the Court to make a ruling

after the stated period.

If there is no response or opposing

affidavit, the Court can make its decision accordingly.

The

Rule, however, cannot be read to preclude the filing of affidavits after the stated periods.

If the Court has not made

its decision and there has not yet been a hearing, the affidavit on file must be considered with the rest of the record as
outlined in 56(c) in determining whether genuine issues exist.
In the present case, Interlake brought its Motion
for Summary Judgment on or about November 6, 1989. On November
16, 1989, the Allyns requested that they be permitted to file
a tardy response to Interlake1s Motions. Judge Rokich permitted

-10the Allyns to file their response.

An opposing Memorandum and

Affidavit were filed on or about December 18, 1989.

Another

affidavit, similar to that filed with Judge Rokich, was filed
at the same time in the case before Judge Hanson.

Judge

Hanson, however, denied Allyns1 Motion to extend the period
for response and granted Interlakefs Motion for Summary Judgment.

This was done on January 5, 1990.
Even though Judge Hanson denied the motion to extend

the response dates, the Affidavit was filed prior to the date
of Judge Hanson's decision.

It therefore was part of the

record to be considered under Rule 56(c).

The Affidavits

again raised the issues of whether there was a fraudulent
inducement and whether Interlake agreed to not hold the Allyns
personally liable, thereby precluding summary -judgment.
c.

The

admissions

and

opposing

affidavit were

admissible and should have been considered by the trial Courts.
Rule 56(e) sets forth the forum of affidavits that
are required. The affidavit must be made on personal knowledae
and should set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence and should affirmatively show that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein.

Tt further

states that an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading but must respond by affidavit
or as otherwise provided in the Rule, setting forth specific

-11facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
opposing party does

not so respond, summary

If the

judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against him.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the
Allyns responded

by affidavit

in both

proceedings and by

opposing memorandum in the matter before Judge Rokich.

The

Memorandum in addition referred to the Answers to Interlake1s
Interrogatories.

Even if, for purposes of argument, there had

been no affidavits filed, the Allyns1 Response to Reauest for
Admissions raised a genuine issue to be determine by the Court
as is argued above.

Summary Judgment was not appropriate

under Rule 56(c) where the Admissions on file raised a genuine
issue of a material fact.

Therefore, Summary Judgment was

inappropriate even if Judge Hanson's denial of the Allvns
Request for Leave to File a Tardy Response meant that there
had been no response by them.
The Allyns, however, did respond as has been argued
above. The sufficiency of that response, however, was attacked
by Interlake.

Specifically, Interlake argued that the Parole

Evidence Rule excluded the admissions and the testimony proffered in the opposing Affidavits.
The opposing Affidavits on their face stated that
the Affiant was competent to testify and that the facts stated
were made on his personal knowledge.

Furthermore, the Affiant

set forth that in conversations with Jeff Perkins, an agent of

-12Interlake, Affiant was assured that there would be no personal
liability on the documents signed by the Allyns.
stated

that based

executed.

on

these assurances

The Affiant

the documents were

The Affidavits, therefore, meet the requirements of

Rule 56(e) unless the statements are inadmissible because of
the Parole Evidence Rule as argued by Interlake.
The Utah Supreme Court in Union Bank v. Swenson, 7 07
P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), addressed this particular issue on facts
that are very similar to those in the case at bar.

Tn Union

Bank, the Swensons signed the note with the bank "individually
and personally".

The Appellant also signed as president of

State Lumber, Inc.
default followed.

The loan subsequently became due and
The Swensons thereafter contested personal

liability on the note.
tive assured

They alleged that the bank representa-

them that they would not be held personally

liable and that without such assurances they would not have
signed the documents.

The trial court applied the Parole

Evidence Rule and found no genuine issue of material fact and
accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of the bank.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial courts finding
based on the fact that the parole evidence rule has a very
narrow application.

Simply stated, the Rule operates in the

absence of fraud to exclude contemporaneous conversations,
statements

or

representations

offered

for

the

purpose of

varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract.

-13Therefore, the Court stated that the trial court must first
determine whether the writing was intended by the parties to
be an integration.

It noted that resolving this preliminary

question of fact, parole evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is admissable.

It further stated that parole evidence

is admissable to show the circumstances under which the contract was made or
executed.

the purpose for which

the writing was

This is so even after the writing is determined to

be an integrated contract.

Admitting parole evidence in such

circumstances, avoids the enforcement of a writing that appears
to be a binding integration but in fact is not because of
fraud or other avoidable cause.
In the present case, Interlake has asserted that the
documents are complete and on their face appear to be the
final agreement between the parties.

While the documents are

standard form documents, the way they were prepared by Interlake

begs

the

contracts.

question

The signature

of

whether

they

were

integrated

lines and parties named

in the

various documents as they concern the Allyns were not consistent and lead to confusion as to who the parties were intended
to be.
Both Judge Rokich and Judge Hanson apparently determined the documentation to be intended as integrated contracts
and that there was no fraudulent inducement and then decided as
a matter of law that summary judgment was proper.

These are

-14questions of fact.

In this case, both Courts have to deter-

mine whether or not the contract between the parties was
integrated.

In addition, they have to determine whether there

are causes

for avoiding

documents.

In regards to these issues, the parole evidence

the

judicial

enforcement

of said

rule is not applicable and therefore does not exclude the
testimony and admissions of the Allyns from the Courts consideration.

Indeed, those very issues have to be resolved before

the parole evidence rule comes into play.

Therefore, summary

judgment is precluded in both cases.
CONCLUSION
Because

the admissions

on

file and

the opposinq

Affidavits of Douglas Allyn genuinely raise a material issue,
summary judgment was inappropriately granted by both Judge
Hanson and Judge Rokich.

Each summary iudgment must be rever-

sed and the matters must each be remanded for further findinq
as to whether the Allyns are personally

liable under the

documentation sought to be enforced by Interlake.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this>y ^ ^ d a y of September,
1990.

0£££

Jonn/Burton An ferson
(Ke^in V. Olsen
Attorneys for Appellants
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JOHN BURTON ANDERSON *0092
KEVIN V. OLSEN #4105
Anderson & Dunn
2039 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephones (801) 944-0990
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINACIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
AMENDED RESPONSE TO
) REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.

)

JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES,
a California Partnership; DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN ALLYN,
SR., dba ALLYN AND COMPANY,
a California Partnership,
Defendants.
Come

now,

)
)
Civil No. C86-6724
)
) Honorable John A. Rokich
)
)
)

the

Defendants,

Douglas

Kent

Allyn,

Richard John Allyn, Sr. and Allyn and Company, a California
Partnership and pursuant to Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure

answer

Plaintiff's

First

Set

of

Requests

for

Admissions as follows:
REQUEST NO, 1:

Admit that the document attached

to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy
of a Promissory Note executed by Defendant Douglas Kent Allyn
on or about May 29, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

-2REQUEST NO. 2:

Admit that the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy
of a Promissory Note executed by Defendant Richard John Allyn,
Sr. on or about May 29, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 3:

Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and

Richard John Allyn executed said Exhibit "A" for and in behalf
of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:
Company
project.

to obtain

Admit that Defendants signed for Allyn and
funding

to complete

the Parkway Village

According to Jeff Perkins, Interlake could not lend

Swank more money because Swank's loan amount would then exceed
it's legal limits.

Interlake needed to make part of the loan

to another company.

Allyn and Company consented to signing for

part of the loan after receiving assurances from Perkins that
Richard J. Allyn and Douglas Kent Allyn would not be personally
liable and that if there was a problem Interlake would simply
take the property back without any personal liability.

Douglas

Kent Allyn and John Swank were working together on the Parkway
Village project.
REQUEST NO. 4:

Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and

Richard John Allyn executed said Exhibit "A" for and in behalf
of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

-3REQUEST NO. 5:

Admit

that John B. Swank was a

partner in Parkway Village, a joint venture, along with Douglas
Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn was working

with John B. Swank on a retainer basis with the anticipation
that Allyn would receive a certain percentage of the Parkway
Village project once it was put together.
REQUEST NO. 6:

Admit that the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rights executed by
Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or about May 29, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 7:

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.,

executed said Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 8:
executed

said

Exhibit

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.,

"B" for and

in behalf of Allyn and

Company.
ANSWER:

Admit, see paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 9:

Admit that the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy
of an Additional

Funds Agreement executed

Allyn on or about June 10, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

by Douglas Kent

-4RBQUBST HO. 10: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 a Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of
an Additional Funds Agreement executed by Richard John Allynr
Sr. on or about June 10, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit that Exhibit "C" is a true and correct

copy, but deny execution of document by Richard J. Allyn.
Douglas Kent Allyn is the one who actually executed the document
for Richard J. Allyn.
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and
Richard John Allyn, Sr. executed said Exhibit "C" for and in
behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn signed for

Richard J. Allyn for Allyn & Company.

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and
Richard John Allyn, Sr. executed said Exhibit "C" for and in
behalf of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 11 above.

REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy
of an Additional

Funds Agreement executed

by Richard John

Allyn, Sr. on or about September 23, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.
executed said Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

-5REQUSST HO. 15: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.
executed

said

Exhibit

"D" for and

in behalf of Allyn and

Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 16:

Admit that the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy
of a Renewal Agreement

executed

by Douglas Kent Allyn on

February 13, 1986.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST

NO. 17:

Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed said Exhibit "E" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.

executed

ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST

NO. 18:

said

Exhibit

Admit

"E" for and

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

in behalf of Allyn and

Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 19:

Admit the document attached

to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy
of a Renewal Agreement executed by Richard John Allyn, Sr.
on or about November 29, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 20:

Admit the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy
of a Renewal Agreement executed by Douglas Kent Allyn on or
about November 29, 1985.

-6ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST WO. 21:
executed

said

Exhibit

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.

"F" for and

in behalf of Allyn and

Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above*

REQUEST NO. 22:

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.

executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 23:

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.,

executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

Deny.

Although the document shows signing

as an individual, Defendant was signing for the partnership.
According to Jeff Perkins, there was to be no personal liability
of the Defendants.
REQUEST

NO. 24:

Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST

NO. 25:

Admit

that

Douglas

Kent Allyn

executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST

NO. 26:

Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed said Exhibit M F" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 23 above.

REQUEST NO. 27: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy

-7~
of a Promissory Note executed by Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or
about March 31, 1986.
ANSWERS

Defendants do not recall this document and

therefore deny.
REQUEST NO. 28:

Admit that the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy
of a Promissory Note executed by Douglas Kent Allyn on or
about March 31, 1986.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 29:
executed

said

Exhibit

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.

"G" for and

in behalf of Allyn and

Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 30:

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.

executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 31:

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.

executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST

NO.

32: Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed Exhibit "6" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 33: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn, Sr.
executed Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

-8RBQUBST

NO.

34:

Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 35: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment

of Rents executed by

Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or about March 31, 1986.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 36: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment

of Rents executed by

Douglas Kent Allyn on or about March 31, 1986.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 37: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 38: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 39: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST

NO.

40:

Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

executed said Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Allyn and
Company.

Allyn

-9ANSWERI

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST

NO.

41:

Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed said Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST

NO.

executed said Exhibit
ANSWER:

42:

Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

f,

H" for and in behalf of himself.

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 43: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy
of a Promissory Note executed by John B. Swank on or about May
29, 1985.
ANSWER:

Defendant Douglas Kent Allyn was present

when many of the documents were signed by John B. Swank and to
the best of his recollection admits that Mr. Swank executed
this document.
REQUEST

NO.

44: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

Exhibit "A" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

Deny.

Originally, the purchaser of the

Parkway Property was to be in a corporate name or Swanks name.
Jeff Perkins indicated, however, that the Plaintiff could not
do that because the loan amount would exceed its legal limit.
As explained in paragraph 3 above, Allyn and Company signed on
the previous documents responded to.

Swank, however, was not

authorized to sign for Allyn and Company, Douglas Kent Allyn
or Richard J. Allyn.

-10REQUEST NO. 45: Admit that Swank executed said Exhibit
"A" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

Defendant can only speculate Mr. Swank's

intent and therefore denies, letting the document speak for
itself.

See also paragraph 44 above.
REQUEST NO. 46: Admit that Swank executed said Exhibit

"A" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO. 47: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by John
B. Swank on or about May 29/ 1985.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 43 above.

REQUEST

NO.

48: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a/ Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 44 above.

REQUEST NO. 49: Admit

that Swank executed

said

Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO. 50: Admit

that Swank executed

said

Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO. 51: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy
of a Renewal Agreement executed by John B. Swank.

-11ANSWESi

See paragraph 43 above.

REQUEST

NO.

52: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

Exhibit " C for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 44 above.

REQUEST

NO*

53: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

Exhibit "C" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO. 54: Admit

that Swank executed

said

Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO. 55: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy
of a Promissory Note executed by John B. Swank on or about
March 31, 1986.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 43 above.

REQUEST

NO.

56: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Richard John Allyn, Sr. and
Douglas Kent Allyn, d/b/a Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 44 above.

REQUEST NO. 57: Admit

that Swank executed

said

Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST

NO.

58: Admit

that

Exhibit "D" for in behalf of himself.

Swank

executed

said

-12AMSWERi

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO, 59: Admit that the documents attached to
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by John
B. Swank on or about March 31, 1986.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 43 above.

REQUEST NO. 60: Admit

that Swank executed

said

Exhibit "E" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 44 above.

REQUEST

NO.

61: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

executed

said

Exhibit "E" for in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST

NO.

62: Admit

that

Swank

Exhibit "E" for in behalf of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 44 above.

REQUEST NO. 63: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments

according

to

the

requirements

of

Exhibit

"A"

to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 64: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments

according

to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

Admit

the

requirements

of

Exhibit

"C* to

-13RBQCJBST HO. 65: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments

according

to

the

requirements

of

Exhibit

"D" to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 66: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments

according

to

the

requirements

of

Exhibit

"G"

to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 67: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments

according

to

the

requirements

of

Exhibit

"A"

to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 68: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments

according

to

the

requirements

of

Exhibit

*D" to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

Admit

DATED this

JV*

day of June, 1988.

CERTIFICATE OF HAMPPBLIVERY
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Amended Response to Requests for
Admissions were ^hand-delivered on the VV* day of June, 1988,
"ft

* _« * ^ V. »w _

to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY at
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt/Lake City, Utah

84145.

JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092
Anderson & Dunn
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 944-0990

*

'

*

>

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
AFFIDAVIT OF
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. CB6-6726
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES,
a California Partnership;
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,
Defendants.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF

)
)ss.
)

The Affiant, Kent Allyn, being first duly sworn uoon
oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That he is competent to testify as a witness and

personally knows the facts stated herein are true.
2.

That in connection with the loan transaction

between Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, Sr., dba
Allyn and Company and Interlake Thrift and is the subiect of
the above-entitled litigation, the following is true to the
best of Affiant's understanding and knowledge:

-2a* The project which is the subiect of the loan
made by Interlake Thrift to Affiant and to the
other parties involved in this transaction was
presented to these parties by Jeff Perkins who
at the time was an officer of Plaintiff.
b»
Said Jeff Perkins particioated in putting
the purchase of the property bv these parties
together and upon information and belief, he,
together with his employer, Interlake Thrift,
received a commission from the seller of the
property involved in the transaction.
c.
The initial money for the down payment in
this transaction came from the loan amount made
by Interlake Thrift to Mr. John Swank for the
purchase of a separate project known as Parkway
Village.
d.
Because efforts at getting a construction
loan had failed, Plaintiff had agreed to advance
funds in the amount of $200,000.00 to J & D
Properties, Inc., which said Perkins had represented to be a valid corporation under the laws
of the State of Utah in order to close the
purchase of the land as part of the project.
e.
All signings by those Defendants were as
corporate officers and not as individuals based
on representations made by Perkins.
f.
After conversations with Perkins and as a
means of accounting, Interlake Thrift and Perkins
assured Affiant and others that there would be
no personal liability toward them as part of the
transaction and the parties then consented to
signing for part of the loan.
g. That Perkins represented that if the proiect
did not go forward, Interlake Thrift would look
only to the property and not to the Defendant's
individually for satisfaction.
Accordingly,
Affiant and Richard John Allyn siqned the loan
documents on that basis.

-33,

That the above information has been recited and

given under oath to Plaintiff's as part of the "Response to
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories11 dated July 22, 19«8
and signed by Affiant and Richard John Allyn, a copy of which
was delivered to Plaintiff,
4,

That the purpose of this Affidavit is to demon-

* it'll e f'he existance of questions of fact with respect to the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff in this matter.
DATED this

/^

day of December, 1989.

QffjClAt. C I M .

JANE A. GUTHRIE
N O T M . y PUBLIC CAUFOPH!/.

PWNOPAL c f n a IN

l a s ^ e n t Allyn

SAN Dlt GO COUNTY
U y C o m m o n E»p May 3 1 . 1 W ^

SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me this
/^ W day of December, 1989.
..?
?0

/

h
My Commissipn
jmmissipn Expires:

/

•

>!

^/V

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Doualas Kent Allyn on this
Iff

day of December, 1989, postage prepaid

to John A.

Anderson, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL S MCCARTHY at 50 South
Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah

84145.
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JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092
Anderson & Dunn
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 944-0990
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COORT
IN ANn FOR SALT [,ARE COUNTY, STATE OK UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, A Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT O?
DOUGLAS KENT ALLVN

)

)
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT ).
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES,
)
a California Partnership?
)
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD)
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND)
COMPANY, a California
)
Partnership,
)
Defendants.
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JOHN B. SWANK an individual, )
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD)
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND)
COMPANY, a Partnership; all
)
dba Parkway Village, a Joint )
Venture,
)
Defendants.

Civil No. CB6-6724

Civil No. C96-6725

-2STATE OP CALIFORNIA )
)ss.
COUNTY
)
The Affiant, Kent Allyn, being first duly sworn uoon
oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That he is competent to testify as a witness and

personally knows the facts stated herein are true.
connection with the loan transactions
f J it a i i d

I I: i c! it a r d

J o h n A1 ] ; -

Allyn and Company and USA Financial Corporation dba Interlake
Thrift, pertaining to certain property known as "The Parkwav
Vi 1 lage" which was a part thereof, the followina is true to
the best of Affiant's understanding and knowledge:
a.
The Parkway village property was purchased
from one of Interlake Thrift's customers who had
completed approximately 50% of the proiect while
being funded 100% of a construction loan of
Interlake Thrift pertaining thereto.
b.
Originally the purchase was to be in the
name of a corporation of the Defendants or in
the alternative in the name of John Swank, one
of the above Defendant's herein. Although Swank
was the main strength to the transaction, Jeff
Perkins, an officer of Interlake Thrift, indicated that Interlake Thrift could not Rave the
transaction in Swank's name because the total
amount would exceed Interlake's legal limit.
c.
After conversations with Perkins and as a
means of accounting, Interlake Thrift and Perkins
assured Affiant and others that there would be
no personal liability toward them as part of the
transaction and the parties then consented to
signing for part of the loan.

i

-3d
That Perkins represented that if the project
did not go forward, Interlake Thrift would look
only to the property and not to the Defendants
individually for satisfaction.
Accordingly,
Affiant and Richard John Allyn signed the loan
documents on that basis.
e. John Swank did not sign on behalf of Allyn
and Company, Affiant or Richard John Allyn.
f. In addition to representations of no personal
liability in connection with said loans, Affiant
and Richard John Allyn relied upon said Perkins
representations as to the value and feasibility
to this project and that Interlake Thrift would
subsequently subordinate its interest in the
project.
g. All monies advanced by Interlake Thrift were
used in either this project or a second project
associated with this project.
11,
Neither Affiant nor Richard John Allyn
received any funds from Interlake Thrift as part
of said loan transaction.
That the above information has been recited and
given under oath to Plaintiff's as part of the "Response to
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories" dated July 22, 198ft
and signed by Affiant and Richard John Allyn, a copy of which
-eel to PI a i " iff.
4

That thp purpose of this Affidavit is to demon-

strate the existance of questions of fact with respect to the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff in this matter.
DATED this j ^

day of.December, 19R9.

Z\

JAfJEA. GUTHRIE

-4SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me this

>4
/^7"3day of December, 1989.

My Commission Expires:

JS7
-l "fv

_

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at
( /i

M.<;

tt

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of

Ite foregoing Affidavit of Douglas Kent Allyn on this

—V *+-fJ

I™

day of December, 1989, postage prepaid

to John A.

Andersor . vAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY at 5(1 South
Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah

84145.

